Hierarchical Brain

Cognoception

Cognoception is a term I have invented because I felt that such a word should exist. It describes the making, and use of, a model or symbol schema in my brain that represents an internal brain process or concept. Examples are attention, perception, action, memory and free will.

A direct parallel can be drawn with perception: perception is the afferent processing of incoming sense data relating to something outside my brain, with the end result of the activation of a symbol schema that represents the thing being perceived and the potential update of this symbol schema; cognoception involves exactly the same processing, but of data from inside my brain relating to an internal brain process or concept, and the activation and/or update of a symbol schema that represents that brain process or concept. Symbol schemas created and activated by cognoception are part of the self symbol schema that represents my self.

Because it depends on the existence of symbol schemas, cognoception resides at level 6 in my hierarchical structure of levels of description, along with perception and other high-level functions.

Etymology and usage

• The source of the word is from the prefix “cogno...” meaning “brain” or “thought” (but originally just “learning” or “knowing”), and the suffix “...ception” which means “to take” or “understand”.
  • Obviously I have copied directly from other words that describe the same process for data from outside the brain such as “perception”, “proprioception” and “interoception” (see a fuller list of other ...ception words).
  • The word “perception”, and I think also other “...ception” words, is sometimes used to mean the processing of data that leads to the end result, and at other times used to mean the end result alone, which (in my terms) is the activation of a symbol schema. The same therefore applies to the word “cognoception”.
  • Part of my proposals, however, is that the processing of data for both perception and cognoception is described by afferent processing, because the processing of sense data from both external and internal senses is done in exactly the same way as the processing of data from internal brain processes.

Overview

• Cognoception is the creation and/or update and activation of a symbol schema that represents part of, or the whole of, a process in the brain. These schemas are likely to be stored in a hierarchical structure with many symbol schemas representing the many single instances of the use of the process at the “bottom”, and a symbol schema representing the whole process at the “top”.
  • For example, when I see or use a frisbee for the first time and a symbol schema representing the frisbee is created (which I can notate as {frisbee} - see symbol schema notation), and then, through the process of attention, this encounter becomes conscious by connecting to the self symbol schema ({self}), a new symbol schema representing the process of “attention on the frisbee” ({attention on frisbee}) is likely to be created - see afferent processing examples 7 and 8 for details of how this may happen.
  • Then, when see a frisbee in the future, the activation of {frisbee} will trigger the activation of {attention on frisbee}, which means that I will remember the original event, and also be aware that I was involved in that original event.
  • Similarly, when I think about a frisbee in the future, the activation of {attention on frisbee} will trigger the activation of {frisbee}, which also means that I will remember the original event, and be aware that I was involved in that original event.
  • The creation of many symbol schemas, each representing attention on different things ({attention on X}), will eventually lead to the creation of a single high-level symbol schema that represents the whole process of attention ({attention}).
  • However, like all symbol schemas, {attention} is a compressed and simplified version of reality. It will represent my ability to perceive and recall things (apparently) at will, and my ability to focus my attention on that thing. It will not contain any detail on how that perception works, how attention works, or how they are linked together (more on this below).
• Examples of other brain processes that will have symbol schemas created that represent them are attention, memory, action and perception.
  • So cognoception is the perception by the self of an aspect of the self, or the perception by the self symbol schema of an aspect of the self symbol schema.
  • It is exactly parallel to a perception of an ordinary symbol schema, for example of a frisbee, except that both the subject and the object are internal, and both within the self symbol schema.
• There are many other symbols schemas that can only be created or updated from information relating to symbol schemas created by cognoception; they are not brain processes, but are concepts or properties relating to me, or relating to my self symbol schema.
  • Examples are symbol schemas for the actions I have taken, the things I have remembered and the times I have made important choices. When aggregated together, these become higher-level symbol schemas that represent things like my beliefs, desires, preferences and goals, my upbringing, personality and so on, and then also my sense of agency and volition.
  • Most of these, being variable properties of my self, will not reside within my self symbol schema, but will be closely connected to it, although I think some basic aspects of my personality that are unlikely to change can be considered to be part of my self symbol schema.
  • These are used for aspects of my action and decision-making process, so are important for free will.

Other writer’s descriptions

• A number of people have touched on this subject, but the only person I know to have discussed cognoception in any detail (obviously without using this term) is Michael Graziano.
  • His Attention Schema Theory proposes that subjective awareness is actually a model of the brain’s process of attention^{1, 2}, but he does not give any information on how the brain creates this model, and (as far as I can find) does not make any suggestion that the processing required to do this is the same as the brain uses to process sense data.
  • He does acknowledge, in two later papers, that other brain processes are likely to be modelled by the brain^{3, 4}.
  • The difficulty I have with his theory is that it is entirely based on his definition of consciousness as being “subjective awareness”.
    • My innate feeling (based on introspection) is that attention is exactly the same as awareness, but I also know (now) that my introspection is only accessing a model or schema of attention, not the real process of attention.
    • The real process of attention, being a multi-level hierarchical competitive process with afferent, efferent and lateral influences, happens completely outside my conscious awareness.
    • I propose that what I call my consciousness is more than just self-awareness and requires a number of other processes or features as well, such as memory, feelings and emotions and attention itself.
    • Graziano admits that his theory does not explain the “subjective” part of “subjective awareness”⁵.
• Another well-known author who mentions the subject in a much more oblique way is Antonio Damasio⁶.
  • He describes “subjectivity” (which he defines as being the same as consciousness) as partly being “images” that represent the creation of other “images”, which I think must be the process of perception.
  • His meaning of “image” is very similar to what I call a symbol schema, so this description resembles cognoception.
  • However, he provides no more details on how this comes about or what the results are.
• The German philosopher Thomas Metzinger says a rather similar thing to Damasio in a criticism of Graziano’s Attention Schema Theory (see above), but his description is even more difficult to follow⁷.
  • He claims that consciousness is a model of the world, which includes a model of itself and other people.
  • He also says the model is transparent, by which I think he means that we cannot be aware of it, and that we experience the model rather than the world.
• In his 1979 book “Godel, Escher, Bach”, Douglas Hofstadter says that what he calls the “self-subsystem” includes symbols for mental activity, that are symbols for the actions of symbols⁸.

Further details

• The following are further detailed points about my proposals for cognoception, some of which are important for my proposals for free will.
• Although I propose that exactly the same afferent processing is used for both perception and cognoception, there are some differences between the two in the level of processing and also the way the resulting symbol schemas are used.
  • Perhaps surprisingly, my self symbol schema and other symbol schemas within it are more inaccurate than the symbol schemas that represent external objects. The reason for this is the nature of the access the brain has to the data that is processed to create and update them.
    • For a frisbee, for example, I can see it from many different angles, feel it and hear it (or if I really wanted to, I could look at it through a microscope, cut it up with a saw or attempt to make another one myself and try it out to see if it works).
    • For brain processes that are aspects of my self, such as my attention, free will, perception or memory, I cannot do any of these things; the only data is what is available in my brain at the level of the schema, and this data is quite limited (more on this below).
    • The symbol schemas created by cognoception that represent internal brain processes must take a lot longer to form in childhood, because they can only start forming once the self symbol schema is in place (which is only by the age of about three or four). It is also possible that they could be very different between different people.
      • The contents of symbol schemas that represent many abstract concepts must be different between different people, whereas the symbol schema for a frisbee or other concrete object will generally be very similar in different people.
      • The data that will contribute to the contents of symbol schemas for abstract concepts in my brain, such as “truth”, “the economy” and “height”, are not as definite as those for concrete objects, but at least they can be updated by many different encounters, things I might read or get from other media, or discussions with other people.
      • The indications are (for example, from the three other writers outlined above), that other people probably do have similar models of their internal brain processes to me, although their content is generally only discussed indirectly.
  • The only data available for the creation or update of symbol schemas created by cognoception that represent internal brain processes is obtained via attention, and only those aspects of attention that are conscious.
    • For example, my symbol schema that represents my perception (that I can notate as {perception} - see symbol schema notation), can only be updated by conscious perceptions, which are those that are either initiated by conscious attention, of come to my conscious attention.
      • This is because, at the level of my self symbol schema, there is (and can be) no knowledge of the subconscious processing that precedes consciousness; data only reaches my self symbol schema when it becomes conscious, and a perception only becomes conscious via the process of attention.
      • Another way of looking at this is that it is because they are at completely different levels of description. In my proposed hierarchy, the low-level subconscious processes are at levels 2 and level 3, whereas the self symbol schema is in level 4 and attention, perception and cognoception are all at level 6.
      • The coincidences that are detected that can cause {perception} to be updated are when {self} sends efferent signals to perceive the frisbee, and the afferent signals arrive back at {self} via attention. If my attention is diverted by some sudden external stimulus so I do not end up perceiving the frisbee, then there is no coincidence and so no update will take place.
      • This process actually updates {perception of frisbee} first, but that can then update {perception}.
    • In the same way, {memory} can only be updated by conscious recall initiated via attention; items or events that come into my consciousness without my conscious initiation (which happens by the process of thought) are not modelled, because {self} has no knowledge of that process.
    • Similarly, {free will} can only be updated by decisions that {self} initiates, via attention (see free will).
    • Less obviously perhaps, {action} is also only updated by consciously initiated actions, which can only be done by the process of attention, and yet our bodies make many actions without conscious interference.
  • To summarise the points above, my inherent knowledge of my own brain processes is incomplete rather than inaccurate, because it only includes those aspects of the processes that impinge on my consciousness via the process of attention. I do have a good inherent understanding of those aspects of the processes that are conscious.
    • For free will, in particular, this is an important point, because it means that my belief that I have conscious choice must be correct, at least for the things that I do have conscious input to. This implies downward causation (see free will).
    • Choices that my brain makes without my conscious input are generally not what we mean by free will anyway.
  • What is perhaps the strangest aspect of all this is that my conscious brain does not seem to be at all concerned that things happen that are obviously caused by my brain, but that do not agree with my model of those things.
    • All the time, my brain is initiating actions, but my conscious brain knows nothing about those actions and does not remember initiating them or carrying them out. My model of action says this does not happen, and yet I am not continually surprised by it happening. In fact, if I am asked afterwards about why I did something, I either just say I did it automatically, or I make up a reason, even though I did not have a reason at the time.
    • Similarly with decision making and free will: my brain makes decisions all the time, some I have conscious input to, but many are made without my conscious input. My model of free will says it is me that makes conscious decisions, and yet this does not come as a surprise to me. If I am asked afterwards why I chose a particular option that was taken subconsciously, I may often come up with reasons - this is generally called confabulation.
  • There is one other subtle difference between a normal symbol schema created by perception and one created by cognoception: a perception can be updated either consciously or unconsciously, but a cognoception is only ever updated consciously.
    • A symbol schema created by perception can be created, updated or activated without it being connected to the self symbol schema by the process of attention, so it does not become consciously available.
    • A symbol schema created by cognoception is already part of the self symbol schema, so when it is created, updated or activated, it is always going be as part of a conscious process.
    • For example, if I consciously see a frisbee, the symbol schema for a frisbee is activated, and the signals make it through the filter of attention to connect with my self symbol schema, and the attention schema connecting these two is also activated. This means that I am aware of the frisbee, but I can also always be aware that I am aware of it.
    • This is a basic description of how my self-awareness comes about, and is a more detailed description than given by Graziano’s Attention Schema Theory (see above).
• Finally, I have documented some illusions of cognoception as part of my explanation of the explanatory gap that show that my perception of myself is very similar to my perception of external objects.
  • The majority of the processing is carried out unconsciously, and is very largely dependent on previous experience and knowledge relating to “me”.
  • The schema that represents “me” in my brain, including those parts that represent my brain processes, is built up over many years and is very large and complex with many related aspects and connections. All new experiences are capable of making subtle changes to this schema.
  • Illusions of cognoception show that not only do I perceive myself only via a model, but also show that the model of myself is more incomplete than any model I have in my brain of almost anything else.

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References For information on references, see structure of this website - references

1. ^ The attention schema theory: a mechanistic account of subjective awareness - Webb and Graziano 2015
   doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00500 downloadable here or see GoogleScholar.
   Beginning of conclusion on page 9: “We argue that the attention schema theory provides a possible answer to the puzzle of subjective experience. The core claim of the theory is that the brain computes a simplified model of the process and current state of attention, and that the content of this model is the basis of subjective reports. According to the theory, subjective reports such as 'I am aware of X' involve the following steps. Stimulus X is encoded as a representation in the brain, competing with other stimulus representations for the brain’s limited processing resources. If stimulus X wins this signal competition, resulting in its being deeply processed by the brain, then stimulus X is attended. According to the theory, an additional step is needed to produce a report of subjective awareness of stimulus X. The brain has to compute a model of the process of attention itself. Attention is, in a sense, a relevant attribute of the stimulus. It’s red, it’s round, it’s at this location, and it’s being attended by me. The complex phenomenon of a stimulus being selectively processed by the brain, attention, is represented in a simplified model, an attention schema.”
2. ^ Rethinking Consciousness - Graziano 2019 Norton & Company USA
   Third paragraph of dust cover blurb: “Graziano proposes that in order to monitor and control this specialized attention, the brain evolved a simplified model of it - a cartoonish self-description depicting an internal essence with a capacity for knowledge and experience. In other words, consciousness.”
3. ^ Toward a standard model of consciousness: Reconciling the attention schema, global workspace, higher-order thought, and illusionist theories - Graziano, Guterstam, Bio and Wilterson 2019
   doi: 10.1080/02643294.2019.1670630 downloadable here or see GoogleScholar.
   Page 5: under the heading “Why a model of attention?”: “...why limit the theory to attention? The brain contains other processes such as decision-making, memory, and movement coordination. The brain might construct models of these other cognitive processes as well. Why not build a theory of consciousness around a decision-making schema, the brain’s quick-and-dirty model of how it makes decisions? Or a memory schema, the brain’s imperfect model of how it stores and retrieves memory? ... First, it is likely that the brain does build models of these other internal processes. However, they do not seem to correlate tightly with consciousness. ... Neither decision-making nor memory are tightly correlated with consciousness. In contrast, attention and consciousness have a closer relationship. ... the evidence suggests that attention and subjective awareness are tightly linked and difficult to separate. If you are directing attention toward something, you are likely to be conscious of it. If you are directing no attention toward something, you are unlikely to be conscious of it. You may think you are continuously aware of the full world around you regardless of how your attention is deployed, but that is not so. There are many now-classic experiments on what is called inattentional blindness, in which withdrawal of attention from an item leads to a loss of awareness of the item.”
4. ^ Consciousness and the attention schema: Why it has to be right - Graziano 2020
   doi: 10.1080/02643294.2020.1761782 downloadable here or see GoogleScholar.
   Page 7, under the heading “Concern 3: Why the focus on attention?”: “...why does AST [the Attention Schema Theory] link consciousness specifically to an attention schema? Why not a memory schema? Or a decision-making schema? Or a mental imagery schema? Or a response schema? Why not just say: consciousness is a mind schema? I agree with the general idea. The brain must model many aspects of itself. If by 'consciousness' you mean the broader content in the mind, then, of course, consciousness contains models of many things far beyond attention.”
5. ^ Consciousness explained or described? - Schurger and Graziano 2022
   doi: 10.1093/nc/niac00 downloadable here or see GoogleScholar.
   Page 5, third paragraph: “AST explains why people are convinced that they have this extra something. AST does not explain how this extra something comes about.”
6. ^ The strange order of things: Life, feeling and the making of cultures - Antonio Damasio Pantheon Books USA 2018
   See page 151, second paragraph: “... part of the process of subjectivity is made from the same kind of material with which we construct the manifest contents held in subjectivity, specifically, images. But while the kind of material is the same, the source is different. Rather than corresponding to the objects, actions, or events, which normally dominate consciousness, these particular images correspond to general images of our own bodies, as a whole, caught in the act of producing those other images. This new set of images constitutes a partial revelation of the process of making the manifest contents of mind deftly and quietly inserted along those other images [sic].... The new set of images helps describe nothing less than the owner’s body in the process of acquiring other images, but unless you pay close attention, you hardly notice them.”
   This seems to be saying, in rather imprecise language, that the brain creates 'images' (which are what I call symbol schemas) that represent the making of other images, i.e. the process of perception. So this is very similar to my concept of cognoception.
7. ^ Self-modeling epistemic spaces and the contraction principle - Metzinger 2020
   doi: 10.1080/02643294.2020.1729110 downloadable here or see GoogleScholar.
   This philosophical paper is a criticism of Graziano’s Attention Schema Theory (see references above), but is much more difficult to understand.
   Beginning of article under the heading “1. Strong points: The contribution AST makes”: “What Graziano and colleagues describe as the 'attention schema' really is one special case of what I have called the 'phenomenal model of the intentionality relation' (PMIR)...”
   So I think a PMIR is similar to what I might call the symbol schema for action or attention.
   Page 199 under the heading “4. Bringing it all together: The contraction principle” in the first paragraph: “What is conscious simply is a part of an organism’s model of the world, a specific processing layer in its internal model of reality - which typically also includes the organism itself and other agents in the world. 'Phenomenality' is a property of an integrated, global state. This is a theory, and we know that it is a theory. From the organism’s inner perspective, things are very different. The model is transparent; therefore, the representational medium is invisible. It is not experienced as a world-model, but simply as the world.”
   
8. ^ Godel, Escher, Bach - Douglas Hofstadter Penguin Books UK 1979 or see GoogleScholar.
   Page 387 under the heading “The self-system and consciousness”, first paragraph: “A very important side effect of the self-subsystem is that it can play the role of 'soul', in the following sense: in communicating constantly with the rest of the subsystems and systems in the brain, it keep track of what symbols are active, and in what way.”

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